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Abstract
Combining a lab-in-the-field experiment with field data,
we study the effect of social preferences on performance in a
modified teamwork setting, where the production of a public
good serves as basis for incentivized individual performance,
but is not a goal in itself. Examples of such modified team
settings are knowledge sharing, peer coaching, and cooper-
ative learning – all highly relevant topics for organizations
today. As opposed to a standard public good setting, we
find that conditional cooperators and their team partners
are not more successful in producing the target output. In
contrast, selfish individuals tend to perform better individu-
ally, without generating negative externalities for their team
partners, as measured by the incentivized individual perfor-
mance.
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1 Introduction
Teamwork is key for organizations today (Lazear and Shaw 2007, De-
larue et al. 2008). From an economic point of view, teamwork is a public
good, where individuals jointly manage an asset (the team production)
from which all of them benefit, but that requires costly and unobserv-
able individual resources to build or to sustain (Alchian and Demsetz
1972, Holmstrom 1982, Rob and Zemsky 2002). Group members’ social
preferences strongly influence the contributions of individual resources
to the public good. Production is more successful when the group in-
cludes conditional cooperators – individuals who behave reciprocally –
among its members (Fischbacher et al. 2001). This has been shown in
the lab, where the common workhorse for these studies is a repeated
public good game (Isaac et al. 1984), as well as in the field, where,
for instance, groups with a larger share of conditional cooperators are
more successful in forest commons management (Rustagi et al. 2010).
Given the findings above, one would be tempted to conclude that
firms and organizations relying on teamwork should try to hire as many
conditional cooperators as possible. However, in practice, a widespread
type of teamwork exists that is not fully captured by the pure public
good setting: exchanges among workers with the objective of building
and sharing knowledge, that subsequently serves as basis for individual
production of a valuable product, but is not directly incentivized itself.
A situation of this kind is the exchange of best practice in firms
(Tsai 2001, Szulanski et al. 2016), a crucial factor for generating, and
continuously renewing, competitive advantage (Szulanski 1996). Very
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frequently, organizations encourage workers to exchange success recipes
or jointly think about solving problems that they cannot crack on their
own. However, such kind of exchanges with the objective of knowledge
building and sharing are rarely incentivized as strongly as individual
performance, e.g., quantity or quality of the output. The modified team
setting also covers documentation, peer coaching, and cross-functional
cooperation, all highly relevant aspects of today’s corporate life. Our
study examines whether conditional cooperators perform better than
other social types in this modified team setting.
Our field setting – a challenging mandatory course for mathematics
freshmen at a university in Germany – provides an example of the mod-
ified team environment, where cooperative learning constitutes a core
component of knowledge acquisition (Slavin 1980). This educational
standard (Ernest 2010) is communicated to the students by the faculty.
The students are therefore required to hand in weekly homework as-
signments in teams of two. Achieving a minimum of 50% of points on
the assignments over the semester is required to gain exam admission,
but there are no external incentives to perform beyond this hurdle. The
problems are so difficult, that the students cannot obtain the solution
on their own. Individual preparation and team discussions are required
to obtain satisfactory answers to the problems and, ultimately, to ac-
quire the necessary knowledge for individual performance on the exam.
The students are made aware of these facts by the instructor.
Students’ social preferences are measured in a public good game
(lab-in-the-field), using the standard procedure from Fischbacher et al.
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(2001).1 We control for individual ability, time spent on individual
preparation and team discussions (students’ self-reports). The main
outcome variable is the student’s individual performance on the exam.
In addition, we collect data on students’ self-reported satisfaction with
the joint work and the team partners’ performance.
There are reasons to expect that conditional cooperators will thrive
in the modified team setting as they would in a standard public good
game, because they are willing to contribute and to punish defectors.
At the same time, it is not guaranteed that higher contributions to
the public good always translate into higher individual output (points
on the exam in our case). It may happen that conditional cooperators
will not select the best strategy to produce the target individual output
most efficiently.
We find that conditional cooperators and their team partners are
not more successful in the modified setting. In contrast, free riders have
a statistically significantly better individual performance on the final
exam than other social types, controlling for ability, and do not gen-
erate externalities, negative or positive, on their partners’ individual
performance, as measured by the performance on the final exam com-
pared to the performance of students paired with other social types.
In addition, free riders are perceived as more competent by their team
partners, controlling for ability. At the same time, we obtain some evi-
dence that free riders may contribute less individual preparation to the
joint production of knowledge and therefore show expected free riding
1The translated instructions are documented in Appendix A.
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behavior. We provide potential explanations for our findings in the
discussion section.
2 Related Literature
Knowledge is an important organizational resource, providing a com-
petitive advantage for firms in dynamic environments (Spender and
Grant 1996). The knowledge base of the firm can be enhanced through
the creation of new knowledge and the sharing of existing knowledge
among employees (Grant 1996, Wang and Noe 2010). As Quinn et al.
(1996) note, knowledge creation and sharing in organizations are inter-
related: As one employee shares knowledge with another employee, the
receiver gains information, and at the same time poses questions and
makes amplifications and modifications, that add knowledge for the
original sender. Thus, not surprisingly, firms have invested consider-
able amounts of financial resources in knowledge management systems
intended to help knowledge sharing and creation (Wang and Noe 2010).
Prior research has identified contributions to these systems as a public
good (Cabrera and Cabrera 2002), because every employee can access
the knowledge and its value does not diminish with use.
Considering knowledge sharing among purely self-interested em-
ployees, Siemsen et al. (2007) investigate optimal incentive systems to
promote individual task-related effort and knowledge sharing in teams
using a principal agent model. The authors find that individual and
team incentives are complements, because individuals will share knowl-
edge if they believe their coworkers will apply the knowledge (due to
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individual incentives) which in turn benefits the sharer (due to team
incentives).
More closely related to our research that takes into account social
preferences, Wang and Noe (2010) review the literature from man-
agement, organizational behavior, and applied psychology on knowl-
edge sharing and identify avenues for future research. While prior re-
search has identified important individual characteristics determining
the propensity to share knowledge, like exchange ideology (Lin 2007)
and openness to experience (Cabrera et al. 2006), the authors consider
the examination of further individual attitudes and personality traits
as promising field for further research. We contribute to this literature
by investigating how social preferences translate into individual per-
formance in a field setting where knowledge creation and sharing in a
team is key.
Additionally, the education literature has paid extensive attention
to cooperative learning, which describes the process of putting stu-
dents in intergroup exchanges as a viable method to increase student
achievements (Slavin 1980). Several studies report positive effects such
as increased student performance and the favorable development of in-
terpersonal skills (Ciccotello et al. 1997). However, despite the benefits
of cooperative learning, some studies report negative effects for some
students (see Holt et al. 1997, Lundberg and Lundberg 1992, Robinson
1990). Especially, the free rider problem can turn cooperative learn-
ing to a negative experience and decrease overall performance (Joyce
1999), in particular when the team performance is weakly incentivized.
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Therefore, it is important to gather additional evidence on the impact
of social preferences on the outcome of cooperative learning.
The effect of social preferences on contributions in the standard
public good setting has been studied extensively, mostly in the lab
(Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010, Chaudhuri
2011). A common finding is that groups that count conditional cooper-
ators among their members produce higher contribution levels. There
are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, conditional coopera-
tors contribute to the common project, if they perceive that others are
contributing as well. Second, conditional cooperators motivate selfish
members, who rationally expect contributions from conditional cooper-
ators in return, to participate more in the common project, at least in
the first periods of a repeated game. Finally, the effects are amplified
when punishment opportunities are given, as conditional cooperators
negatively reciprocate free riding, punishing it even at a personal cost
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).
There is ample evidence that social preferences are related to be-
havior in real life. Less selfish individuals are more likely to donate to
charity (Benz and Meier 2008), and to participate in crowd-sourcing,
such as Wikipedia (Algan et al. 2013). Gneezy et al. (2015) find that
fishermen who must rely on teamwork due to environmental factors
show more pro-social preferences across a range of experimental games
than their neighbors who work individually. A detailed overview of the
literature on the generalizations of social behavior from the lab to the
field, including its limitations, is given in Burks et al. (2016). This
study shows that U.S. truck drivers’ social preferences are related to
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their behavior toward their peers, but not toward the experimenters,
with whom the truck drivers have fewer social connections.
Conditional cooperation, or reciprocity, is particularly relevant for
determining real-world outcomes. For example, cross-country skiers
contribute more to the preparation of tracks, if they believe that oth-
ers do so, too (Heldt 2005). Students’ donations to a scholarship corre-
late with their beliefs about others’ donations (Frey and Meier 2004).
Reciprocity measured as second-mover behavior in a trust game (trust-
worthiness) is related to sales people’s choice of selling strategy and
success (Essl et al. 2018). Finally, according to a large-scale survey
with employees in Germany, reciprocity influences tax morale (Frey
and Torgler 2007) and effort exerted at work (Dohmen et al. 2009).
3 Study Design and Data Collection
The data was collected during the 2015/2016 winter semester in the
course Analysis I at a major university in Germany. The 10 European
Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) course is manda-
tory for freshmen, and is the main course in mathematics in the first
semester.2 The course consists of two lectures per week, as well as a
weekly tutorial in which take-home assignments are discussed. Class
attendance is not compulsory. The typical exam failure rates in math-
ematics are about 30% to 50%, with 40% to 60% of students dropping
out of university during the first few semesters. Thus, mathematics is
2The curriculum for the first semester consists of 31 ECTS, with a total of 19 ECTS in
mathematics and 12 ECTS in related subjects.
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a challenging subject to study, and Analysis I is the first demanding
course in mathematics.
To encourage learner-learner exchange, students are given weekly
take-home assignments to solve in teams of two. The problem sets
are designed to be difficult to the degree that the vast majority of
students cannot successfully solve them on their own. Accordingly, the
instructor makes students aware of the importance of joint work as a
prerequisite for successful exam performance.
Each assignment is graded per team, meaning that the two team
members receive the same number of points. At least 50% of points
must be obtained to gain exam admission. In the data set, no team
failed to receive exam admission by at least the last assignment. We
conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment to assess the students’ social
preferences. In addition, we were given access to pseudo-anonymized
data of individual exam grades, team composition, and scores for the
homework assignments during the semester.3 Figure 1 illustrates the
timing of events and data collection.
3The students agreed that their student ID number would be matched with their player
number, and stored physically at the university where the study was conducted. The key
was used only once, at the end of the semester, to match the experimental data with the
course data. Furthermore, students were assured that the key would be erased by the













Week 14: Exam 1
Week 23: Exam 2
Week 30: Exam 3
Figure 1: Timing of the study.
In the first lecture, students took a test of high school math. The
grade on this test was used as the measure of mathematical ability.
Controlling for ability is important to avoid endogeneity in later analy-
ses, as students with higher ability are more likely to earn better course
grades.
In the second lecture, students were instructed by the lecturer to
form teams of two. These teams had to turn in the homework as-
signments together. Due to fairness concerns, and as requested by the
instructor, we had to keep the team formation procedure unchanged
compared to previous semesters. Thus, we were not allowed to ma-
nipulate the formation of the teams. However, the teams formed at
the beginning of the semester, and students had to sign up immedi-
ately after class with their partner. This reduced the probability that
students selected their partners strategically. In the survey, 93% of
students stated that they had not known the team partner before the
course.
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In week 12 of the semester, all students present in the lecture partic-
ipated in a classroom paper-pen public good experiment that followed
the procedure in Fischbacher et al. (2001). In total, 111 students out
of the 158 enrolled students (roughly 70%) were present for this lecture
and participated in the initial test of ability. All students present chose
to participate in the study.4 Participants decided on an unconditional
contribution and a full (conditional) contribution table. Every partici-
pant was endowed with e 5 (10 points). Integer contributions between
0 and 10 points were allowed. To capture the context of the take-home
assignments, experimental groups consisted of two members. The effi-
ciency factor of α = 0.7 guaranteed a sufficient balance between indi-
vidual and collective utility. To minimize social concerns toward their
peers, students were informed that their decisions would be matched
with those of another student from a different university.5 After the ex-
periment, students filled out a survey, stating how many hours per week
they generally spent on the take-home assignment working individually
and in the team, measured in 5-hour intervals, and how satisfied they
were with the team cooperation and their partners’ competence and en-
gagement. In addition, students entered their demographic data, and
indicated when they had first met their team partner. Finally, students
signed a consent form allowing us to use their pseudo-anonymized data
in the study.
There were three exam dates during weeks 14, 23, and 30, respec-
tively. Students were free to register for one of these three dates (in
4One student refused to share his or her pseudo-anonymized exam data, and one failed to
fill out the questionnaire. Both students’ answers were excluded from the analysis.
5We collected the matched data two weeks later, and organized the payments shortly after.
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case they failed a try, they could retake one of the subsequent exams),
or they could even postpone the exam to the next semester. All tests
were designed to be equally difficult. The variables used in the study
are summarized in Table 1.




Individual performance Points earned on the exam (min. 0; max. 60)
Self-stated satisfaction with teamwork
Self-stated satisfaction with partner’s engagement and







t Ability Test of mathematical skills in the first lecture
Social preferences Experimental measures from public good game
Individual preparation Self-reported hours spent on the assignments individually weekly
Team discussions Self-reported hours spent on the assignments in the team weekly
A total of 158 students were enrolled in Analysis I. We obtained
measurements of social preferences in the lab-in-the-field experiment
of 125 individuals. Of those subjects, N = 111 were also present when
ability was measured.6 For 85 of these students, we additionally have
the experimental measures of their team partner. Both types of obser-
vations receive attention in the main analysis. 76 observations contain
individual performance, ability, and experimental measures for both
team members. This enables us to assess the quality of teamwork with
the team members’ perceived competence and engagement, and overall
satisfaction with cooperation, while controlling for ability.
6Note that lecture attendance is not mandatory.
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4 A Simple Model of the Modified Teamwork Set-
ting
Our field setting represents a modified teamwork situation, where the
teamwork is not directly and continuously incentivized, but constitutes
a basis for later individual performance. As argued in sections 1 and 2,
this kind of situation is common in organizations. The knowledge ac-
quisition phase (i.e. the work on the problem sets) constitutes a public
good situation with knowledge generated being the public good. Due
to the fact that the problem sets at hand are of significant difficulty
and cannot be solved alone, they need to be prepared beforehand and
later discussed in the team. There are thus two types of contributions
to the public good: individual preparation time and team discussions.
Both are non-excludable and non-rivalrous: During the team discus-
sion, students cannot exclude each other either from the results of their
individual preparation nor from the results of the discussion itself; in-
sights created during both of the contributions do not diminish when
shared and are therefore non-rivalrous.
Note that there is another prominent public good in our setting,
which are the solutions to the problem sets. However, given that the
incentive structure does not foster continuous contributions to this pub-
lic good (50%-hurdle to gain exam admission), we do not consider the
solutions to the problem sets in our analysis.
To illustrate the situation of our study subjects, we assume a simple
knowledge acquisition function where knowledge ki for individual i is
a function of i’s ability ai and the effort that i and her team partner j
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spend on homework assignments. The effort can be invested either in
individual preparation, pi, pj or in joint team discussions, ti, tj. Both
types of effort increase the individual’s and their partner’s knowledge.
Team discussions are required, given that due to the high complexity
level of the problems, individuals can very rarely solve them fully on
their own. Finally, parts of the total available time T that each indi-
vidual has at his or her disposal can also be spent on leisure, li. Thus,
an individual’s productive effort is given as
pi + ti = T − li. (1)
The knowledge acquisition function, thus, looks as follows:
ki = ai + α(pi + pj) + β(ti + tj) (2)
where α and β are the marginal per-capita returns (MPCR) of the
individual preparation and team discussion on knowledge production.
In common public goods with n = 2 individuals, it is usually assumed
that 0.5 < MPCR < 1, indicating that contributions are collectively
efficient but individually detrimental, because the individual has to
fully bear the cost of forfeited leisure but only partly benefits from
own contributions. In our case, it is possible, that the MPCRs on the
two types of contributions differ by individual and team, depending,
e.g., on ability, learning style or team dynamics. However, as long
0.5 < MPCR < 1 holds for all MPCRs, the model is suited to describe
our field setting.
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To summarize, collaborative learning is illustrated by a public good
game, where the public good is the acquired knowledge and the con-
tribution is problem-solving effort, spent individually or in the team.
Though the public good and the individual contributions have different
“denominations” (effort vs. knowledge), they are both non-rivalrous
and non-excludable, given that no member of the team can be ex-
cluded from the solutions and both can use the solutions to build up
own knowledge. Finally, the incentivized target output is the indi-
vidual’s performance on the exam, a function of knowledge and other
unobservable factors, such as stress resistance, the mood on the day of
the exam, etc.
The simple model, of course, has several limitations. First, it ignores
possible interactions between effort spent on individual preparation and
team discussion, which can be substitutes (as better preparation makes
for a more efficient and thus shorter team discussion) or complements
(better prepared individuals have more to talk about, and may choose
to solve more problems to create more knowledge that will help them
perform on the exam).
Second, the model ignores potential interactions of ability and ef-
fort. These again can be complex. Individuals of lower ability may
have to spend more time in preparation and discussion to arrive at
similar results than more able individuals. At the same time, they may
be more likely to give up trying and so invest less effort. Individuals of
higher ability may need less preparation time to achieve a given target,
but also may invest more effort in the work in total, aspiring to hit
higher targets. Finally, our model is based on average levels of effort
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and a snapshot of ability. It ignores the dynamics of knowledge acqui-
sition (e.g., impact of knowledge acquired on the MPCR in the next
period).
5 Research Hypotheses
To derive the hypotheses, we start with standard predictions regarding








Hypothesis 1 The effect of ability and effort on individual
performance
i) Subjects with higher ability have better individual performance.
ii) Effort devoted to individual preparation or team discussions
increases individual performance.
Now we turn to the hypothesis regarding the focus of the study: the
effect of social preferences on performance in the modified team setting,
where teamwork is required to produce knowledge, which fosters the in-
centivized individual performance. This teamwork situation resembles
a public good game: Spending effort on problem-solving is individually
costly (MPCR < 1), but if both partners pull their weight, the total
knowledge of the team members increases (n ∗ MPCR > 1). It has
been shown that production of a public good is more successful when
the group includes conditional cooperators (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004,
Rustagi et al. 2010), because conditional cooperators contribute if they
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think the other group members are contributing as well, and they are
willing to punish deviators even at a personal cost. In our modified
team setting, the punishment could mean withholding effort for joint
problem solving with the team partner in the future or preparing less
individually. Thus, building on the findings from standard public good
settings, we arrive at the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 The effect of social preferences on individual
performance
i) Conditional cooperators’ individual performance is better than
that of other social types, controlling for ability.
ii) Conditional cooperators’ partners’ individual performance is
better than that of other social types, controlling for ability.
Finally, we predict that this positive effect on individual perfor-
mance also translates into higher satisfaction with the teamwork itself.
Several studies have shown theoretically and empirically that workers
value team production in a cooperative environment (Kosfeld and von
Siemens 2011, Rabin 1993, Hamilton et al. 2003), so we expect this to
be the case in our setting as well.
Hypothesis 3 The effect of social preferences on the perception of
teamwork quality by the team members.
· Individuals whose team partner is a conditional cooperator are
more satisfied with their partners’ engagement and competence,
and the overall collaboration than individuals paired with a
person of any other social type.
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The following section contains analyses evaluating these hypotheses.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the N = 111 individuals for whom we
obtained social preferences and ability: 48.7% (N = 54) are classified as
conditional cooperators following the definition by Fischbacher et al.
(2001). 17.1% (N = 19) contribute 0 in every conditional decision,
and are classified as free riders. Around 17.1% (N = 19) show a hump-
shaped contribution pattern. 2 subjects (1.8%) altruistically contribute
all their endowment independently of the decision of the counterpart.
For 15.3% (N = 17), social preferences cannot be classified according
to standard definitions.
Ability is coded discretely between 1 and 5, with 1 the lowest grade
and 5 the highest. A Kruskal-Wallis rank test7 cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the distribution of ability does not differ across social
types (χ24 = 3.050, p = 0.55); that is, social preferences do not explain
differences in ability.
























1 2 3 4 5
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Figure 2: Distribution of social preferences and ability among subjects. Clas-
sification of social preferences according to Fischbacher et al. (2001). Ability
is coded discretely from 1 to 5 with 1 being the worst and 5 being the best
grade in the initial test.
Table 2 summarizes the number of students participating in each
exam, the average number of points for those who passed (the main
dependent variable), and the percentage of students who failed the
exam.
Table 2: Exam results
Exam I Exam II Exam III Total
Number of students 8 127 58 150
Average points for students who pass 38.8 36.1 31.0 34.9
Failure rate 37.5% 41.7% 53.4% 29.3%
Notes: Of the 158 totally enrolled students, 8 did not sign up for an exam, and 44 failed,
of whom 43 students retook the exam. In the column Total, each student is counted once.
Exams are designed to be of comparable difficulty. Differences in the failure rate can be
explained by selection effects.
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In the following, we illustrate the relationship between individual
preparation time and the time spent in team discussions. The Spear-
man correlation shows no correlation (Spearman’s rho = -0.0256 at
p < 0.79), suggesting that the two types of contributions are nei-
ther substitutes nor complements. Figure 3 clusters the two variables
against each other and illustrates the respective frequencies. Distribu-
tions are shown on an aggregate level for all types and then separately
for the social types of main interest: conditional cooperators and free
riders.
Figure 3: The relationship between individual preparation time and time
spent in team discussions pooled across all types and separated for condi-
tional cooperators and free riders.
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We observe that free riders seem to underinvest in individual prepa-
ration time and thus to free ride on this public good contribution.
While the Kruskal-Wallis test of the distribution of individual prepara-
tion among social types is not significant (p = 0.15), a logistic regres-
sion (Table 5, Appendix B) shows evidence that free riders indeed tend
to contribute less individual preparation time (p < 0.1). We provide a
potential reason for this finding in the discussion.
6.2 Regression Analyses
Table 3 contains the main regression analyses of this study related to
hypotheses 1 and 2. The dependent variable is individual performance
measured by the number of points obtained on the exam, distributed
between 0 and 60, with 30 points as the minimum number necessary
to pass.8 In model (1), the independent variables are ability, and the
self-reported number of weekly hours spent on the homework with in-
dividual preparation and working together with the team partner.9 For
both effort variables, the category “less than 5 hours per week” serves
as a reference. Model (2) considers the effect of the student’s social
type and model (3) the effect of the team partner’s social type. In
8We use Tobit regressions to fit the data to the lower and upper bounds as given by the
exam. The coefficients and significance are qualitatively the same if we use an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression instead. In order to rule out multicollinearity, we conduct
an analysis of variance inflated factors (VIF) of the main regressions. The average values
of each regression are between 1.10 and 1.52 with no individual value exceeding 2.01.
Following Hair et al. (2010), those values indicate no issues with multicollinearity.
9Table 6 in Appendix B shows the same regression with combined effort levels. Results
remain qualitatively the same, with more effort implying a better performance on the
exam.
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all cases the undefined social types serve as the reference category.10
Changing the reference type to all non-free riders yield qualitatively
similar results.
10Two students classified as altruists are also part of the reference category. Regressions
in which these two observations are part of a separate category or in which they are
dropped yield results similar to those presented here.
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Table 3: Tobit regressions with exam score as the dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Ability 13.703∗∗∗ 13.794∗∗∗ 14.039∗∗∗
(0.985) (1.007) (1.091)
Team discussions: 5-10 hrs -0.426 -0.679 3.948
(2.586) (2.603) (2.724)
Team discussions: > 10 hrs 6.386 7.265∗ 9.047∗∗
(3.910) (3.666) (3.905)
Indiv. preparation: 5-10 hrs 19.596∗∗∗ 110.08∗∗∗ 19.876∗∗∗
(2.824) (2.616) (3.379)
Indiv. preparation > 10 hrs -1.815 -0.396 7.783
(4.849) (4.978) (5.102)
Free rider 19.793∗∗∗ 6.925∗∗
(3.267) (3.474)




Partner, free rider 0.373
(4.992)




Constant 117.33∗∗∗ 112.58∗∗∗ 10.95∗
(3.284) (4.182) (5.561)
Observations 111 111 85
Pseudo-R2 0.027 0.034 0.037
Notes: Lower and upper bounds, 0 and 60, respectively. Robust standard
errors, clustered on the team level, in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The first hypothesis predicts that the main output (individual per-
formance) depends on one’s ability and the effort invested in solving
the assignments. Table 3 provides evidence in support of this hypoth-
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esis. The coefficient of Ability is statistically significant in all three
models.11 For example, according to model (1), a student who obtains
a one-point higher grade on the ability test in the first week receives
around an additional 3.7 points on the final exam. Regarding effort,
it can be seen that individual preparation time is already useful at a
lower level, while working together pays off in grades only after students
spend more than 10 hours per week working together. This result is
reasonable, because individual task-solving capacities are attained af-
ter a short phase in the beginning, whereas teams need to spend time
with interacting socially and overcoming communication problems at
first. Then, teamwork becomes extremely effective, with team mem-
bers earning 7 to 9 additional points individually on the exam. Table 6
in Appendix B combines both types of effort for each student.12 In all
specifications, more effort is associated with a better individual perfor-
mance. Evidence can be summarized as:
Result 1: Ability and effort, spent on individual preparation or team
discussions, increase individual performance.
The main hypothesis 2 examines the individual performance of the so-
cial types. According to models (2) and (3) in Table 3, conditional
cooperators do not perform statistically significantly better than other
social types. In addition, in model (3) the coefficient of Partner, condi-
tional cooperator is negative and is not statistically significant, mean-
11Adding a measure for the differences in ability among the team members does not
qualitatively change the results.
12Different specifications, such as controlling for the exam date, leave the results qualita-
tively the same.
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ing that working together with a conditional cooperator does not lead
to higher individual grades.
In contrast, free riders statistically significantly outperform other
social types, earning, on average, around 7 to 10 more points on the
exam. Next, we examine whether the free rider’s success comes at the
expense of their team partners. In model (3), the coefficient of Partner,
free rider is not significant, meaning that being on a team with a free
rider does not lead to earning lower individual grades. Incorporating
the partner’s ability in models (1) to (3) does not change the results,
while the respective coefficient is small and insignificant in every model.
The same holds for incorporating the partner’s individual preparation
time.13 The main result of the study can be summarized as follows:
Result 2: Controlling for ability, conditional cooperators do not
perform statistically significantly better on the exam compared to
other social types. In addition, the conditional cooperator’s team
partners also do not perform significantly better. In contrast, free
riders produce significantly higher individual output than other social
types, and do not generate externalities for their partners, measured
by individual performance compared to that of students, whose team
partners are not classified as free riders.
Hypothesis 3 concerns the students’ self-reported satisfaction with joint
work. Satisfaction with their partners’ engagement and competence,
and the overall cooperation is measured on a scale between 0 (“fully
13Results available on request.
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unsatisfied”) to 3 (“fully satisfied”). Table 4 presents the regression
results of the assessments.
Table 4: Tobit regressions on the satisfaction with the team partner’s com-
petence, engagement and the cooperation overall
(1) (2) (3)
Competence Engagement Cooperation
Partner conditional cooperator 0.7421 0.2561 -0.326
(0.494) (1.038) (0.208)
Partner free rider 1.280∗∗ -0.058 -0.120
(0.540) (1.054) (0.305)
Partner hump-shaped 0.0661 -0.777 -0.054
(0.598) (1.089) (0.327)
Partner’s ability 10.475∗∗∗ 0.5021 -0.083
(0.175) (0.324) (0.093)
Ability of person who assesses -0.131 -0.309 0.1351
(0.160) (0.291) (0.110)
Constant 11.258∗∗∗ 12.971∗∗∗ 11.930∗∗∗
(0.456) (1.091) (0.288)
Observations 76 76 76
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.027 0.017
Notes: Lower and upper bounds, from 0 (“fully unsatisfied”) to 3 (“fully satisfied”).
Robust standard errors, clustered on team level, in parentheses. Significance levels:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The team partner’s assessment of the conditional cooperators’ com-
petence is positive, but not statistically significant. In contrast, part-
ners are significantly more satisfied with free riders’ competence, com-
pared to the reference category of unclassified individuals (p < 0.05).
This result holds when controlling for ability, which is itself a signifi-
cant factor of satisfaction with a student’s competence, as assessed by
his or her teammate (p < 0.01). There are no significant differences
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across the partners’ social types regarding the satisfaction with their
engagement or the overall cooperation. The below results summarizes
the observations:
Result 3: Free riders are perceived as more competent by their team
partners, controlling for ability. There is no such effect for conditional
cooperators or other social types. The assessment of the team
partner’s engagement and the overall collaboration does not depend
on the partner’s social type.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The present study tests the effect of social preferences on performance
in a modified teamwork setting. In this setting, collective work is not
continuously externally incentivized, but is necessary to produce valu-
able individual output. This framework applies to a number of impor-
tant situations in the organizational context, such as internal knowledge
sharing, peer coaching or cross-functional collaboration. In general, any
situation where collaboration with others is desired (by the organiza-
tion, the management or other architects of those environments), but
not incentivized as strongly as individual work, can be described by
our modified teamwork environment.
For example, salespeople typically receive motivation based on in-
dividual performance, potentially combined with a (lower weighted)
component of team performance. However, the organization would like
salespeople to learn from and share knowledge with their peers to pro-
mote everyone’s competence and ultimately the combined sales. To
29
conduct a useful coaching session in the sales context, both partners
need to prepare and to make time to sit down together to serve a client.
Of course, the individual abilities influence the effectiveness of coaching
and the resulting level of sales.
A similar description is valid for typical situations of cross-functional
collaboration. Assuming that the organization does not work in an
agile project mode, typically workers in every department would be
incentivized according to their specific functional responsibilities (e.g.,
the performance indicators for workers in product development would
reflect the success of the development of products, those of workers in
operations the quality of product servicing, etc). At the same time, the
organization would attempt to foster cross-functional collaboration, re-
duce siloed thinking, to make sure, e.g., that the new products designed
are easy to service. To engage in a cross-functional exchange, workers
would have to spend time on preparation and the exchange itself, and
the results of such an exchange would be influenced by the workers’
abilities as would be their ultimate incentivized performance.
Even though not explicitly embedded in a corporate environment,
the study context – a lab-in-the-field experiment with university stu-
dents combined with field data – allows us to reliably reflect on the
modified team setting, measuring individual output (final grades), abil-
ities, and to some extent the effort invested into individual preparation
and teamwork.
The initial hypotheses regarding the higher achievement of condi-
tional cooperators with respect to individual performance and quality
of teamwork must be rejected. We do not find better performances on
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the exam for conditional cooperators or their team partners. Condi-
tional cooperators are also not perceived as more engaged or competent
by their team partners and their team partners are not more satisfied
with the general level of team cooperation than other social types’
partners. In contrast, free riders perform significantly better on the
final exam compared to other social types. Free riders do not gen-
erate externalities, negative or positive, on their partners’ individual
performance, measured by comparing the partners’ performance on the
exam to other students’ results, who were not on teams with free rid-
ers. Teams that include free riders do not need significantly more time
to achieve joint production targets, and team partners are significantly
more satisfied with free riders’ competence than with the competence
of other social types, controlling for ability.
Overall, based on the data, we conclude that when team exchanges
are just part of a bigger picture, ultimately resulting in individual pro-
duction, the presence of conditional cooperators does not always have
a positive effect, and the presence of free riders does not always have
a negative effect on team production, as in classical teamwork. On the
contrary, free riders seem to be more successful in producing individ-
ual output without hurting others’ performance, even though there is
some evidence that they may contribute less individual preparation to
the joint work, whereas we see no differences in contributions to team
discussions. These findings on contribution levels could be due to the
fact that individual preparation time is a non-observable contribution
to the public good. Contrary to that, free riders are at risk of be-
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ing punished by the team partner when they shirk on the observable
contribution: team discussions.
A possible reason for the success of free riders in the final exam
could be that they have a tendency toward rationality, which is an
advantage for math studies. This explanation is, however, unlikely to
be decisive in this case, as free riders do not perform better on the initial
test, and we control for ability in the regression. Another potential
explanation for our observations is that, having spent less time on
individual preparation, free riders are less depleted when joining the
team discussion. Thus, they benefit more from the discussion and
make a more competent impression on their team partners than other,
better prepared but more depleted social types. A further explanation
can be that free riders, whose social preferences have been found to
correlate with higher creativity (Diebels et al. 2018, Silvia et al. 2011),
come up with innovative solutions during the discussion, impressing
their team partners with their competence. Creativity and selfishness
both correlate with a higher propensity to lie (Gino and Ariely 2012,
Guentner 2016), so that the team partners may never find out that the
free riders have invested less time in individual preparation. Regarding
the higher competence rating of free riders, it has also been found that
free riders are more assertive (Diebels et al. 2018). This may contribute
to them being perceived as more competent according to the influential
stereotype content model (Fiske et al. 2018, Fiske 2018).
By showing that free riders may work more efficiently in a mod-
ified team setting, the study provides clear managerial implications.
First, hiring people with selfish social preferences for jobs that involve
32
the modified team setting may prove useful based on the results of
the study. In addition, for firms that like to capture the benefits of
teamwork, but at the same time, aim to reduce the problem of free
riding, they could try to transform teamwork in a modified team set-
ting, by adding an individually measurable output, or linking the joint
production more clearly to the incentivized individual output.
Indeed, in our case, there was no doubt for the students that by
investing time into the public good they finally and significantly pro-
moted their individual performance, which may explain why the free
riders in our case behaved differently than in some other studies on
cooperative learning. These measures could help organizations save re-
sources on screening out free riders at the recruitment stage, or giving
up on team output lost due to free riding, but strategically embed work-
ers, based on their social preference, in suitable team environments.
In the given setting, several factors beyond social preferences and
ability can influence performance. For instance, the degree of dynamic
inconsistency (impatience) may vary among students, leading some of
them to abandon coursework during the semester in favor of leisure
and partying, despite the wish to earn a high grade (Augenblick et al.
2015). In addition, the level of trust toward the course instructor, and
his claim that teamwork is important, may lead students to take the
homework assignments more or less seriously. We chose not to control
for these factors, for two reasons. First, because we are not aware of
studies that show that these reasons are related to social preferences.
Second, we aimed to keep the data collection simple to realize in a
classroom environment during a lecture.
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The study, of course, has several limitations. The analysis uses
self-reported data on the team partner’s assessment and on the effort
invested, which might be biased systematically by social preferences.
In addition, we were not able to use random assignment to teams. Al-
though 93% of students claimed that they had not known their team
partner before the course, there might still be unobserved factors in-
fluencing team composition that have not been reflected in the data.
Finally, because this study focused on only one course in the curricu-
lum, we are not able to observe the effect of partnering with a free
rider in a multitasking context, for example, taking multiple courses
into account. It may well be that students in teams with free riders
must invest more effort to study for the selected challenging mandatory
course, and that their performance in other courses suffers. Our data,
though, does not provide support for that potential observation, given
that the time spent on individual preparation or team discussions of
Analysis I does not depend on the partner’s social preferences.
Future research on the modified team setting should use longitudi-
nal data to study how the effects of social preference on performance
develop over time, and take into account multitasking, as described
in the previous paragraph. Also, studying social preferences in the
modified team setting in a corporate environment would help under-
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By participating in today’s game you take part in a scientific study
about decisions. Please read this instruction carefully. The game is
going to last approximately 45 minutes. You won’t have any additional
effort. Depending on your decisions you have the opportunity to earn
a payment which you will receive in cash in Analysis 1 on December
9, 2015 .
You are not allowed to speak during the game. If you have
a question, raise your hand and a person who conducts the game will
come to your seat. A non-observance of these rules leads to an exclusion
of the game and the payment.
Of course, you are free to choose whether to take part in the
study or not. You have the possibility to withdraw your agreement at
any time without giving reasons and without personal disadvantages.
During the game, your payment is determined in points and will be
converted to Euro at the end of the game. It counts




You are in a group of two. Every group member needs to decide
about the use of 10 points. The points can be put wholly or partly
to a private account or can be invested in a project. Every point
that is not invested in the project will be automatically put in the
private account.
Earnings from the private account
For every point you put in the private account you earn exactly one
point:
Earnings from private account = Own contribution to
private account
Example: If you put 10 points in the private account, you earn 10
points out of it. If you put 6 points in the private account, you earn
6 points out of it. No person other than yourself earns out of your
contribution to your private account.
Earnings from the project
Not just you, but also your other group member will earn from your
investment to the project. Conversely, you earn from the other group
member’s investment to the project.
The earnings from the project for every group member are defined
as followed:
Earnings from the project = Sum of the contributions to the
project × 0.7
Example: If every group member invests 10 points to the project, you
and your other group member earn 20 × 0.7 = 14 points out of the
project. If one group member invests 8 points and the other one invests
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7 points, every group member earns (8 + 7) × 0.7 = 10.5 points out of
the project.
Total earnings
Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from the private ac-
count and the project.
Earnings from the private account = 10 − Your contribution to the project




Please respond to the following comprehension questions. They are
merely aimed at familiarizing you with the calculation of the earnings
which occur with the different decisions about the use of the 10 points.
1. Every group member has 10 points at his disposal. You invest
9 points to the project. The other group member contributes 6
points to the project.
(a) How high are your total earnings in points?
 10.0  15.0  11.5  10.5  6.5
(b) How high are the total earnings of the other group member
in points?
 8.0  11.5  7.5  14.5  8.0
2. Every group member has 10 points at his disposal. The other
group member contributes 5 points to the project.
(a) How high are your total earnings if you invest - additionally
to the 5 points invested by the other group member - 0 points
in the project?
 15.0  13.0  19.4  13.5  9.0
(b) How high are your total earnings if you invest - additionally
to the 5 points invested by the other group member - 10
points in the project?
 12.5  6.5  10.5  8.0  6.0
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The game
The game involves the decision situation as previously described. From
now on you are part of a group of two. The other group member is
a student from another university. Neither you nor another par-
ticipant knows who the other person of his group is. The
compositions of the other groups are also unknown.
Now you have 10 points at your disposal which you can put in your
private account or invest to the project. Every group member has to
make two types of contribution decisions. In the following, they’re
called unconditional and conditional contribution.
1. In the first type of contribution decisions (unconditional con-
tribution) you have to determine how many of the 10 points you
want to invest.
2. Your second task is to complete a contribution table with your
conditional contributions. For every possible contribution
of the other group member you need to give an amount of points
to the project in the contribution table as answer to this contri-
bution.
Once all participants have made their unconditional and conditional
contribution decisions one group member of each group will be ran-
domly chosen. For the randomly chosen group member only the
completed table is relevant. For the other, not randomly chosen group
member is solely the unconditional contribution relevant. Therefore the
unconditional contribution of one group member and the correspond-
ing conditional contribution of the other group member is included in
the calculation of the payments
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Your decisions
You and your other group member each have 10 points to spend. Please
decide on the unconditional contribution and all possible conditional
contributions.
Unconditional contribution:
1. How many points would you like to invest to the project? .........
point(s)
Conditional contribution (Please take all eleven decisions):
Please fill whole numbers between 0 and 10.
1. If the other group member contributes 0 points: ......... points
2. If the other group member contributes 1 points: ......... points
3. If the other group member contributes 2 points: ......... points
4. If the other group member contributes 3 points: ......... points
5. If the other group member contributes 4 points: ......... points
6. If the other group member contributes 5 points: ......... points
7. If the other group member contributes 6 points: ......... points
8. If the other group member contributes 7 points: ......... points
9. If the other group member contributes 8 points: ......... points
10. If the other group member contributes 9 points: ......... points
11. If the other group member contributes 10 points: ......... points
Please fill out the questionnaire on the next page. For this you receive
additional 2 EUR to your earnings from the game.
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Appendix B: Supplementary analyses
Table 5: Ordered logistic regression with time spent on team discussions
and time spent on individual preparation as the dependent variables
(1) (2)
Team discussions Individual preparation
Ability -0.327 0.0104
(0.201) (0.196)
Free rider -0.127 -1.480∗
(0.783) (0.866)




Partner, free rider 1.161
(0.920)
Partner, conditional cooperator -0.542 0.479
(0.434) (0.813)
Partner, hump-shaped -0.596 0.386
(0.694) (0.842)
Observations 85 85
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.070
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered on team level, in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Tobit regressions on the final score (individual and team time
combined)
(1) (2) (3)
Ability 14.160∗∗∗ 14.237∗∗∗ 14.397∗∗∗
(0.960) (1.000) (1.082)
individual prep. & team disc.: 10-15 hrs 2.770 2.172 7.133∗∗
(3.054) (3.010) (3.484)
individual prep. & team disc.: 15-20 hrs 6.750∗ 6.918∗ 8.271∗
(3.544) (3.531) (4.768)
individual prep. & team disc.: > 20 hours 6.758 8.380 116.73∗∗∗
(6.123) (5.924) (4.367)
Free rider 8.929∗∗ 5.871
(3.677) (3.591)




Partner, free rider -0.594
(4.586)




Constant 115.70∗∗∗ 112.42∗∗∗ 11.50∗∗
(3.279) (4.239) (5.233)
Observations 111 111 85
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.024 0.050
Notes: Lower and upper bounds, 0 and 60, respectively. Table contains new categories
for individual preparation time and team discussions. Robust standard errors, clustered
on team level, in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
